Capital Sporting Grounds: A History of Stadium and Ballpark Construction in Washington. By Brett L. Abrams, D.C. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarlane and Company, Inc., 2009.

In 2004, Washington D.C. was in line to become the new home of the hapless and homeless Montreal Expos. The deal was contingent on public financing for a new stadium. Mayor Anthony Williams pitched a new stadium in terms of the economic benefit to the city. That was the standard boilerplate argument for a publicly financed stadium in most cities, but, as Brett L. Abrams observes in Capital Sporting Grounds: A History of Stadium and Ballpark Construction in Washington, D.C., it was unique in the nation’s capital. Until 2004, stadium construction was never about economic benefit, but about prestige and status.

The key to understanding the politics of stadium construction in Washington, D.C., Abrams argues, is to regard the capital as four different cities. Most cities are two: the local city of those buildings and people within the city limits, and the regional city of the surrounding area. In addition, Washington is also an international city, consisting of the foreign embassies, international agencies, and their staffs, and a federal city, made up of the federal buildings and monuments, including the Capitol and White House, as well as the politicians and federal employees. (10-17) The constituency of the local city and regional city included Washington’s professional franchises and other spectator sports, such as the professional cycling circuit of the late nineteenth century. However, stadium plans were driven mainly by the constituency of the federal city, with an eye toward the perception of the international city. The federal city wanted a stadium that would befit Washington’s status as a national capital, and put [it] on par with capitals such as London and Paris, which served as centers of national life. The history of stadium building in Washington has [often been one of] conflict between the local/regional and federal/international constituencies over the purpose of stadium building.

The local city was ill served by ownership. The National League entry of the 1890s specialized in poor management and worse baseball. (59) It was disbanded after the 1899 season. In 1901 the American League placed a new franchise in the abandoned capital. Its first stadium was a twenty-five minute ride from Capitol Hill, an unusual location. The National Football League arrived in the 1930s when the Boston Redskins moved to the capital. The Senators and the Redskins usually wanted stadiums in a central location. Federal officials (representing the federal city) had more grandiose visions of building large stadiums named for general purposes. Senator Theodore Bilbo proposed a 100,000-seat war memorial stadium in 1944, and a Pennsylvania congressman immediately proposed a 200,000-seat monstrosity. In 1997 Marion Barry sought a publicly financed stadium to win the 2008 Olympic games. When that failed, Washington put forth a grander scheme for the 2012 games, despite Mitt Romney’s warning that the Olympics were an economic loser. Meanwhile, the local city received less attention. Two versions of the Senators left town (although not over stadium deals). When Jack Kent Cooke failed to secure a publicly financed stadium for the Redskins, he moved the team to Laurel, Maryland.

Stadium construction in Washington, D.C. has always been a tangled mess of money, politics, and prestige, and Abrams sorts the mess out clearly. This book would be very appropriate for a course in sports history or urban studies.

Robert W. Smith

Worcester State University